116(8)

C O P Y

ANNEX 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
OUTGOING TELEGRAM

REVIEWED BY WOLF JR DATE 5/25/87

TOP SECRET

RDS☐or XDS☐EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. August 1, 1947
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED☒ RELEASABLE☒
RELEASE DENIED☐
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

2

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON. (No. 3304)

TOP SECRET FOR EYES ONLY OF DOUGLAS FROM MARSHALL

You will have seen from my personal message to Bevin that I wish you to see him personally in regard to our concern at the present trend of British policy as exemplified by the communication referred to therein. We wish the British Government clearly to understand that we regard this decision as having been taken without consultation or adequate warning to this Government. We knew in a general way of the British intention progressively to withdraw its troops from Greece but we are unable to understand, unless there are reasons not disclosed to this Government why the British Government should choose this moment to take a decision to withdraw one of the stabilizing factors in the Greek situation. The fact that no announcement was made has not prevented the substance from leaking out to the British press. The British Government must be aware of the acute embarrassment caused this Government by the manner in which the British decision to cease after April 1 all aid to Greece was communicated to us as late as the latter part of February as a result of which the President himself was required personally to appeal to the Congress in order to permit the U.S. to take over the British financial responsibilities in Greece and Turkey. The British Govt must be made to understand that this Govt cannot possibly expect to obtain support either in public opinion or in Congress for actions necessitated by sudden decisions presented to us by the British.

The decision to reduce British forces in Italy for the reason given in my message to Bevin is an even more flagrant case of the failure to consult this Govt on a matter involving joint U.S.-U.K. responsibility.

We are frankly disturbed and puzzled by present British actions as exemplified by the communication in question and their implications on the future course of British policy. We are aware of the critical nature of the British financial

position/

position but we do not feel that the full story has been conveyed to us. We fear we are being faced with the first of a series of actions stemming from new policies unknown to us. The British must understand that if these actions presage a basic revision of British foreign policy involving a progressive withdrawal from previous commitments and previously held positions as a result of internal political pressures and not economic necessity alone, the U.S. must be told now of such probable course. For example, in the recent communication concerning troop reductions in Italy and Greece we are unable to see that some 20,000 men will have an advantage to England either from the point of view of manpower or dollar savings in any way commensurate with the possible consequences of such action. It should be obvious that any such course whether from necessity or choice on the part of Great Britain would involve thorough reexamination of the U.S. strategic position and a reconsideration of its financial and economic commitments in Europe. A large measure of U.S. foreign policy has been predicated upon the British willingness to contribute what they can to the maintenance of stability in Europe.

The foregoing is for guidance in your conversation with Bevin and we hope that you will be able to obtain from him a clear and accurate picture of the reasons behind present British action and their relation to future British policy. We are not unmindful of the considerations set forth in your 3173, June 11 and 4071, July.

MARSHALL

C:CEBohlen:EB

EUR:HFMatthews:EB